This eBook has 2 parts.
The first looks at the ethical and psychological factors and dynamics in the cultural context of supporting political candidates in PEI.
The much larger Part 2 presents information and evidence on the Atcon scandal in New Brunswick that happened in 2009, and Mark Ledwell’s key role in that massive fraud costing NB taxpayers $63.4 million.
Chapter 1: A “Bird’s-eye” overview of the Atcon Scandal
Chapter 2: “Calling out lipstick on a pig” – The Ernst & Young Report for Scotiabank (August, 2009)
Chapter 3: $35.4 Million of “pig lipstick” uncovered – The Richter Forensic Audit (February, 2011)
Chapter 4: “Going nowhere….slowly” – The NB 9-year failed lawsuit against Atcon (2014 – 2021)
Chapter 5: “Unanswered Questions” – The Auditor General’s first report on Atcon (2015)
Chapter 6: “Doomed to fail,” – The Auditor General’s second report on Atcon (2017)
Chapter 7: “Relax – we can work this out” – The NB CA ruling against Grant Thornton & Kent Ostridge, January 7, 2025
Chapter 8: “Closing the book” -The November 7, 2025 “s\Settlement Agreement” between NB government and the Atcon CFO Katrina Donovan
Chapter 9: “At the Helm” – Mark Ledwell’s key role in the Atcon scandal
EPILOGUE
“Between a rock and a hard place: reflections on the upcoming February 7th PC Leadership Convention
In 2007–2008, the Atcon Group, headquartered in Miramichi, New Brunswick, was one of the province’s largest industrial employers. Led by President Robert Tozer who co-founded Atcon in 1978; and from 2002-2009, Mark Ledwell, Vice-President of Operations, legal counsel and public sp9kesperson for the group.
It reached its peak operations during the mid-2000s, then in 2007-08 began a steady slide downwards fast, ultimately ending with the company going into receivership in 2010.
At its peak in 2008, Atcon employed approximately 2,000 people across North America and Europe. However, as financial troubles began in late 2008, this number dropped significantly, major projects were suffering shut-downs or delays, and Atcon’s “borrowing base” deteriorated to the point where the company was facing insolvency.
ATCON was effectively on the verge of bankruptcy in 2007-2008, wasn’t paying creditors, was juggling multiple lawsuits that had been launched by disgruntled people and companies, yet Atcon management of just 3 people had a private company jet, were buying expensive jewelry, and were giving lucrative salaries to family members as “employees” who were not doing any work for Atcon.
Then in early 2009, an appeal was made by Atcon management to NB Premier Shawn Graham for $50 million in loan guarantees. That was just months after receiving a loan for 13.4 million in 2008, for a bridge project in the NWT that had gone completely off the rails, but that’s another story.
That $50 million request came with the standard hard-sell forecasts of severe economic hardship for the region if major assistance wasn’t forthcoming, a position Premier Shawn Graham then took to Cabinet with a passionate bid to get Cabinet approval, which he eventually got, but it took him THREE attempts before finally bending all the elbows.
Premier Graham wanted Cabinet to waive “security” on those three Scotiabank loan guarantees totaling $50 million, so not surprising that they said “no” twice.
Yet, despite a strong recommendation from the department not to approve the loan, it was approved, without security, and then Mark Ledwell left town, and all that money just evaporated a few months later when Atcon went into receivership and the NB government had to pay Scotiabank on those guarantees.
Both Mark Ledwell and the Chief Financial Officer, Katrina Donovan, had been briefed by a financial officer with Scotiabank – their main lender (about $100 million total debt at time of insolvency). Briefed regarding their very-flawed accounting practices that they were using in financial statements that had been submitted to the bank with existing debt – that was in August, 2009.
Ledwell was told in great detail then how they were misrepresenting the financial health of the company, and not arbitrarily, but massively “to the good,” radically improving the apparent “borrowing base” of Atcon, a misrepresentation to the tune of $18.6 million with the particular ‘period’ for which those Atcon submissions had been made, i.e., it didn’t represent annual figures. .
Atcon had already obtained the $5o million loan guarantees from the New Brunswick government 2 months earlier in June, 2009, using accounting practices that were claimed to be in accordance with CA standards, but were in fact known to NOT be.
The “difference” was not insignificant: $35.4 million!!
That fraudulent financial statement came about when the government asked Atcon for audited financial statements for previous fiscal years with their $50 million loan guarantee request, but Atcon didn’t have them for the most recent years.
Grant Thornton – Kent Ostridge – was then commissioned to prepare that essential financial statement, which was fraudulent, presenting that far-healthier picture of the company than was the case, but nonetheless winning, (still barely and reluctantly I suspect) Cabinet support, overriding both the departmental recommendations not to approve them, and common sense.
It was only when the NB government commissioned its own audit of the affair after Atcon went into receivership – the “Richter Report” – that the province apparently discovered:
(1) the Ernst & Young report form Scotiabank calling into question Atcon accounting practices; and more importantly,
(2) the major errors in the Ostridge/Thornton Financial Assessment claiming to be “in accordance with standard auditing principles”.
The province later claimed in its lawsuit against Grant Thornton and Ostridge that it relied on that fraudulent financial analysis of ATCON commissioned by ATCON management, something that was never challenged, but they failed in their lawsuit nonetheless for technical reasons and got nothing.
The NB lawsuit was ultimately denied at the Supreme Court just a few years ago, in January, 2021, ending that long, pointless legal journey, There were three separate case Rulings – at the NB Supreme Court; the Appeals Court; and then finally the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).
The province lost their case on a technicality – it had waited a full year-and-a-half after the statutory bar of two years had passed before filing.
There was never a chance of success.
The entire attempt to “get justice” appears to have been nothing more than a PR ruse to create the appearance that justice was being sought for clear and major fraud costing taxpayers many millions, not a serious attempt to actually make that happen.
The NB government also filed a ‘complaint’ with the NB Chartered Accountants against Kent Ostridge and Grant Thornton, but that was put on hold while that very pointless legal process wasted 9 years.
A ruling finally came finding Ostridge “guilty as charged” just one year ago, January, 2025.
Ostridge was fined $50,000.
And in exchange for his confession along the line – “O.K. guys….I did indeed commit fraud knowingly so Atcon could get $50 million from New Brunswick,” the NB government dropped all charges against both Ostridge and Grant Thornton.
$50 million is a pretty decent return on a $50,000 investment, so if you’re into that kind of money-making, you might want to tap into Kent’s unique accounting skills in this regard. He never left his desk as c0-manager of the Grant Thornton Moncton office, and despite his big confession last year, he’s still at the ready!
You likely can’t read the text under his picture. It includes, “No matter the client, my goal is the same: to help unlock the full potential of their business ….With more than 30 years of professional experience, I advise clients on a broad range of audit and assurance matters….When I am not in the office you can find me connecting with the local business community and friends on the golf course.”
The financial report prepared by Grant Thornton Chartered Accountant Kent Ostridge was – (by his own admission, albeit, 15 years after-the-fact), a complete fraud.
It had to be to succeed in getting Atcon the money.
Cabinet would absolutely not have approved those loan guarantees for $50 million if the truth that the company was ‘doomed’ had been told.
They say, “numbers don’t lie,” but they definitely did in this instance.
Mark Ledwell was fully briefed on that fraudulent financial report by Ostridge before taking it to the province to meet the legal requirement/terms of the deal he was negotiating on behalf of Atcon.
But more than simply a fraudulent report overstating financials, it was the entire approach taken by Ledwell on behalf of Atcon in negotiating this $50 loan that WAS THE BIGGER FRAUD.
When the Auditor General finally got around to doing a report on the $50 million loan, it suddenly became clear to me that Mark Ledwell knew before he ever went looking for that $50 million – with a fraudulent Financial Statement from Kent Ostridge in hand- EXACTLY what the AG told New Brunswickers years later : “Atcon was doomed to fail… even with the loan guarantees!“:
What must be understood is that Mark Ledwell was looking at this same “big picture” scenario that the AG documented AS IT WAS HAPPENING, from the inside, in “real time,” an actor making decisions making it happen, yet still used a fraudulent financial statement to obtain massive public funding for a company the was doomed, and now he’s saying nothing about any of this, pleading with Islanders to let him manage PEI.
Taking all that money from taxpayers would have been wrong even if what was driving decisions was a stubborn refusal to accept that there was really “no hope of salvaging things” with the Atcon group of companies, given the rapidly-deteriorating situation.
However, it becomes much harder to defend what was done when management was at the very same time spending money on the following kinds of things, Here’s one slide from the 2017 AG Report presentation to the Legislative Assembly:
Telling this story with the evidence that actually backs up the claims that have just been made in the executive summary has generated an “e-Book” of roughly 60 pages.
None of it is my opinion, except comments in the “Epilogue” regarding the candidates in the PC Leadership race.
It’s an “eBook” because there’s no other way to present this information to make the case that needs to be made to make the effort even worthwhile.
What follows cites the most relevant information and organizes it both chronologically and rationally, information from official government documents, court records, witness testimony contained in a Record Book put together by the NB Auditor General of over 600 pages; etc.
I have presented a list of the most important documents below.
I am also providing links to those documents.
Mark Ledwell is counting on becoming Premier in just a few short weeks at the Progressive Conservative Leadership convention scheduled for February 7th.
PC members voting should be aware of Ledwell’s key role in this historic scandal, with the question in mind:
“Is Ledwell the person to manage PEI’s affairs and lead us into the future?”
There will suspicions that I’m ‘working for Lantz” but I’m working for the truth to be known, and as I explain later, both Lantz and Ledwell are – and this is an opinion – the leader PEI needs, will “name” none of the extensive corruption poisoning our democracy, and represent nothing but a distraction from the kind of political action an informed, passionate, and moral electorate needs to be engaged in at this time in PEI’s history.
Pick your poison – I describe the different toxic styles later – but if you’re endorsing EITHER of these individuals with hope for a government with true transparency and moral guidance, you really need to read Part One!!
There’s a cultural tendency in PEI during elections to hook your wagon to a candidate, then focus so exclusively on making that person the victor in the race, that a person’s ethical approach or “framework” for evaluating moral decision-making, that was up to that time based on reasoned principles and truthful facts, suddenly flies out the window.
But we still need to convince ourselves that what we do is ‘moral,’ so a new ethical theory steps in automatically without much notice, bringing with it an attendant ‘shift’ in moral consciousness, as the framework for understanding and interpreting reality changes.
I’ll try to explain better.
Most people use the words “ethical” and “moral” with the exact same meaning in mind, but “ethics” refers more properly to the system of thinking that generates a mental “framework” that provides us with “justification” for our actions in the world being moral, or more simply, ‘intrinsically good”.
Powerful social forces and cultural expectations – including long-standing ‘taboos’ that people grow up with, and just accept without questioning – can ‘trigger’ a shift in the framework of one’s moral thinking, bringing dire consequences for the integrity of one’s moral and spiritual state.
Such a ‘shift’ is instigated in consciousness from outside by cultural and social forces, but usually involves both “social” deception and “personal” self-deception, of which much can be witnessed in the unconditional endorsements for both Rob Lantz and Mark Ledwell these days on social media.
Unconditional, and also “uninformed” about the facts.
It’s all “trust in an unknown” with “visions of political sugar plums” dancing in lots of people’s heads, conjuring up only a positive future in their imaginations if their guy wins, with pleasant days ahead full of prosperity for all [but especially for them].
That ‘big picture’ vision is there in the mind of these loyal supporters, but really only in the ‘background’…it’s not something examined. That’s the policy platform, “long-term” part of the new framework and imagined ‘vision’ that doesn’t get much thought, because the ‘attention’ captivated with ‘short-term’ concerns is almost exclusively on – how to win.
What fuels the increasingly emotional, passionate, and, quite frankly, “irrational” approach to ethical reasoning within the electorate during the election process is the “short-term” goal of winning, again, which rooted in unquestioned support for the candidate.
There’s a ‘built-in taboo’ within the political culture in PEI: absolutely no “attacks”…we Islanders are ALL “good people”!
Unfortunately, to hide corruption, that cultural expectation has intensified and morphed over time into something protecting things that would normally make the candidate’s lack of leadership ability and/or moral integrity so obvious that it would immediately END any chance of victory for that person…and for very good reason.
But such things are NOT to be mentioned, and if they are…..INCOMING!!!!”
SUCH IS THE INFORMATION IN THIS ARTICLE CONCERNING MARK LEDWELL’S KEY ROLE IN THE BIGGEST FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT AND FRAUDULENT SCANDAL IN NEW BRUNSWICK’S HISTORY.
Mark Ledwell supporters will no doubt be eager to discredit this article.
I’m only presenting information I trust “thinking voters” [a dying breed in PEI, I’m afraid] will appreciate having access to for consideration; Islanders who aren’t angered by facts, who love the truth, and are willing to evaluate and verify claims made by others with a little work, then ultimately decide for themselves what to believe, and more importantly, what to do that is both ‘good and true’..
I don’t mind being “attacked by facts,” but it’s the facts and reasonable argument that unfortunately get sacrificed when one embraces the culture of political “niceness” wholeheartedly and unconditionally.
It’s a collectively-shared mindset that makes pointing out what would render a person obviously a BAD CHOICE for leader a very big boo boo…because it’s taboo. (And we wonder why mega-scandals and corrupt schemes keep showing up in our little province).
But seriously, think about why that’s the case. Who is served by this culture of electing people when only ‘nice’ is allowed on the table and no one knows what they are truly voting for? The backroom and status quo is served. That’s who.
I wrote about this before – after a period of pretty nasty comments as I recall, then a supportive one came along that crystalized the “political mindset” that I’m discussing in this Part One from an ethical perspective. That article was titled: “Sanitizing PEI the Island Way,”
Here’s how I started that one:
“Sanitize transitive verb. To make more acceptable by removing unpleasant or offensive features
S-Anne-itize: transitive verb. To make more acceptable by removing unpleasant or offensive features in compliance with the Anne-Land Code of Cordial Conduct and the down-home goodness of Island hospitality.”
And here’s that so-appreciated comment that inspired that particular article:
“Kevin J Arsenault – People appear like the status quo with no ripples. But that allows the political crimes to go on and on. One party quietly lets the previous party’s crimes slip quietly away, and people like the Premier to be a nice guy rather than a really tough honest guy.”
What I want to bring to the surface to examine in this Part One are the operating dynamics at play in the shift in “moral thinking” embedded in this particular dominant cultural ethos, or ‘collectively share consciousness,” that settles into the minds of so many like a dense fog during elections of all kinds in PEI, completely clouding an honest assessment of facts.
To be more precise, as I’ll explain in a minute, this “shift in awareness” with respect to moral thinking is actually a form of corrupted moral consciousness.
Islanders need to transcend the petty blindness of the “endorsement model of thinking” that unfortunately comes with that sickening “the end-justifies the means” demoralizing way of reasoning if we are ever to recapture control of our government and future.
That “endorsement model” makes a person blind; the “S-Anne-itization of political corruption for the sake of being polite culture” KEEPS voters blind!
It does exactly what that succinct comment cited above said: It hides what we need to know about the people we are voting to lead us, so we are rendered powerless to make informed choices for the welfare of Islanders, with a future with true prosperity and freedom of PEI clearly in focus as a goal.
It’s a culture and taboo that ensures the continuation of secret, shadowy control over government by a ‘backroom,’ ‘Insiders Club’ or whatever you want to call it – you know who I’m talking about, the people influencing government policy and programs for personal gain, and hen benefitting personally with secret schemes….lots of schemes.
With a heated bid for leadership within of a major political party now in its dying days, one that will lead to an outcome where either Lantz or Ledwell will become Premier, and given all the corruption and secrecy that has been identified within our government recently with so many issues (Bliss and Wisdom; IRAC; Egaming; PNP; government document destruction, etc.) we absolutely have to do better!
We can’t allow the old way of thinking, behaving, and doing politics (that’s still the way, by the way) continue to blind us to the truth that effectively ensures the continuation of a systemic, corrupt government.
Compromising moral principles and concerns becomes allowable as part of the “game that’s afoot when an immediate contest needs to be won, and ‘bad things’ start to not matter as much.
Much like the psychology of “team support” seen with fans with major sports, i.e. “sure, the guy shouldn’t have tripped the other guy BUT WASN’T IT GREAT THE REF MISSED IT!”
Ethicists refer to this system of ethics as “situation ethics,” where universal principles and codes disappear (universals like “always telling the truth to voters when seeking their support”).
What’s really going on in a person’s head with the onset of this cultural mindset is the emergence of a conflict between what he or she “wants really badly,” and those deeper moral principles saying, “careful now…!!”.
The person begins to engage in a more pragmatic, strategic way of reasoning on issues that don’t invoke those universals for engagement, and follows a new “end-justifies-the-means” framework for moral guidance.
Lying and hiding the faults of candidates becomes morally permissible to the person with an uncomfortable, but effective: “short-term bad; long-term good” way of concluding the guilt felt doing wrong is nonetheless necessary for that greater good down-the-road, which silences the conscience on those pesky universals.
This is self-deception and moral cowardice rolled up into two political ‘rah-rah’ pompoms for self-serving supporters flying blind, which is, sadly, the majority of the PC Party membership voting for either Ledwell or Lantz from all appearances. It’s all about ‘getting more people on the team’.
Keep track of how many questions you hear raised at public events for either candidate on, say, for Lantz “his broken promises regarding egaming and his Accountability Pledge,” or with Ledwell, “Atcon” at public events or the convention.
It’s not a “system of moral thinking” at all this so-called “situation ethics” [There’s lots of books, perhaps the most known is “Situation Ethics: The New Morality,” by Joseph Fletcher], but rather, a way to deceive oneself into believing that doing what you want to do that you’d normally regard as immoral is none-the-less morally acceptable in the situation, i.e, “lesser of two evils” kind of thing, to ‘get what you want’.
Welcome to PEI politics!
There’s a quotation from the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah that’s come to mind, which seems appropriate to close this Part One.
He was speaking “truth” to the corrupted priests and prophets overseeing the Jewish people, a people who had collectively become corrupt themselves in the wake of having been taken captive by the Babylonians.
After a new generation grew up in Babylon as a captured people, knowing nothing but Babylonian customs as far as ‘culture,’ the Jewish people began to participate in the pagan practices more and more, and the priests and prophets propped that up with their false claims that it was all “morally ok,” given the “situation” and that such was not unpleasing to God.
Enter Jeremiah, with his “shame on your apostasy you hypocrites!!” prophecies.
The priests and false prophets proclaiming “all is well” were really only giving the people what they had come to expect…what they wanted!
Lies, so as to “keep the peace” with the Babylonians and enjoy life.
As Jeremiah pointed out so powerfully and succinctly, such deception *priests & prophets) and self-deception (people) was the foundation for collective religious apostasy:
And PEI?
Do we too “love to have it so”?
We do love our raspberry cordial!
No one who has previously wrote or commented on this matter has ever referred to it as “fraud”.
My investigation has revealed that FRAUD is indeed what it was: in fact, a multi-layered scandal of gargantuan proportions, the biggest single mismanaged loss of taxpayer dollars in NB’s history, roughly $70 million in total when all was said and done.
Mark Ledwell was VP of Operations, Legal Counsel, and Public Spokesperson for Atcon for about 7 years until the Fall of 2009 when he resigning abruptly just a few months before Atcon collapsed and went into receivership.
I’ll get to the evidence that now makes a “fraud” claim possible in a later chapter as this tragic story unfolds, one’s that’s never been told, to my knowledge.
Not surprisingly though.
It was just TWO MONTHS ago that the last chapter was written, and only a few months before that (January, 2025] that the NB Chartered Accountants in NB, quietly, in a disciplinary room in Moncton, issued:
(a) a ruling was that confirmed premeditated “fraud” by Kent Ostridge (the ‘firm’ was let off the hook completely);
(b) a fine, and then;
(c) all charges were withdrawn, and the file against Ostridge was closed.
I’m getting ahead of myself.
I’ve organized this Part Two like a book with short chapters, each based on a separate key document or theme. This particular story doesn’t exactly flow out smoothly chronologically, although I’ll deal with the reports that way below for the most part, but because so little was initially known, information needs to be mentioned at times in the telling of this story that only came out in later reports, so there’s some jumping around with the time-line.
The AG did an investigation and report in 2015, for example, but the scope was narrow and it didn’t look at “where the money went,” so another report was done in 2017, which sheds considerably more light on the behind-the-scenes activities happening secretly at Atcon in the 2008-09 time period.
A lot about the scandal and what happened to the many millions only came out much later in official reports, all of which I’ve reviewed.
That’s important to mention, with my Part One reflections in mind, because I’m going to be careful to present only information from those reports in this eBook. So, any accusations against me lobbed without addressing those claims based on accepted facts regarding the Atcon scandal with counter argument and evidence can be identified easily as ‘attacks on me,’ not attacks on the facts, not the truth.
The most important documents needed for a full anatomy of the scandal are the various reports assessing Atcon’s finances; from the Auditor General, from the Conflict Commissioner, etc., so to tell the story properly it’s important to provide some of the most important information from those reports, and then go back to consider statements and events made by Atcon management, including what was said by Mark Ledwell, which is my final chapter in the story.
We want to see if what he said when the scandal happened is consistent with the facts that were only uncovered much later in those various investigations. Facts regarding the overall situation, but also particularly important incidences and events happening during the time leading up to the collapse, and also during and after the time the company went into receivership.
You’ve no doubt already gotten a sense of the main documents from my index, but here’s a chronological list of the reports and court filings on the ATCON scandal relied upon for this eBook with a descriptive note:
(1) Scotiabank Ernst Young Financial Report on Atcon (August, 2009)
This report was private until the AG made it pubic as a document in her second, 2017 look into the Atcon scandal.
(2) Grant Thornton External Review (June, 2009)
A condition for the New Brunswick government providing $50 million in loan guarantees. The report stated that Atcon’s financial statements fairly represented its position. However, this report was later the subject of a decade-long negligence lawsuit, as it failed to detect that the company was on the verge of collapse and presented the company in a far more favorable financial light than was the case.
(3) RSM Richter Forensic Audit (Draft: Feb 2011; Final: Nov 2012)
Commissioned by the Province of New Brunswick after Atcon’s 2010 bankruptcy to investigate financial misstatements.
The “Richter Report” found that Atcon had overstated its revenues by $35.4 million in the year before receiving government help. It revealed a “systemic approach” to misstating income and identified $700,000 in inappropriate personal expenses, including luxury car leases and a vacation property in Aruba.
(4) The Conflict of Interest Commissioner “Ryan Report” (January 2013)
An investigation by Conflict of Interest Commissioner Patrick Ryan. found former Premier Shawn Graham in a conflict of interest for participating in the 2009 decision to grant Atcon loan guarantees while his father, Zezel Graham, was a director for an Atcon subsidiary. Graham was subsequently fined $3,500.
(5) AGNB Report: Financial Assistance to Atcon (Volume I, 2015)
A formal review by Auditor General Kim MacPherson into the province’s $63.4 million loss. This report criticized the Liberal cabinet for disregarding the advice of senior civil servants who had warned that the company was a high risk and its profitability was “marginal.”
(6) AGNB Follow-up Report: Atcon Group (Volume II, 2017): A deep dive into the “extravagance” and management failures of the company.
The Auditor General revealed that taxpayers were left with a $70 million bill while Atcon executives spent money on a corporate jet (costing $8 million over three years) and other luxuries. It highlighted the “critical failure” of the government to maintain security on the loans.
(7) Three Court rulings: NB Supreme Court Ruling; NB Appeal Court Ruling; and Supreme Court of Canada Ruling
Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick case rulings beginning in 2014 with the province’s lawsuit against Atcon’s auditors.
NB Chartered Accountants ruling on Grant Thornton’ s Auditor, Ostridge (January 2025).
Found guilty of fraudulently misrepresenting the Atcon Financial Statements used to garner the $50 loan and fined $350,000.
NB Chartered Accountants “Alternate Dispute Resolution” document re Katrina Donovan, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for Atcon.
This bizarre ‘final step’ before putting the entire Atcon scandal to bed for good dealt with a long-standing complaint filed against Ms. Donovan, Mark Ledwell’s right-hand in the Atcon loan negotiations. It wasn’t a “disciplinary ruling” at all, but a “settlement agreement”. The terms are spelled out in the document.
Those connections were somehow related to the wireless telecommunications industry titled: “Birds of a feather: wireless connections in the Maritimes”.
The article was mostly about deals benefiting wireless companies to which these four Premiers were somehow connected, but I also added the following bit about the ATCON scandal, because that’s what actually triggered Graham’s abrupt resignation as Premier:
“Shawn Graham replaced Bernard Lord as Liberal Premier of New Brunswick in 2006, after Lord became President and CEO of the CWTA. Graham gave $13 million to wireless giant Xplornet around the same time as Ghiz secretly amended his contract with Bell. Xplornet is wholly-owned by Barrett Corporation, and, surprisingly, co-owner Ed Barrett is also a director of Medavie Blue Cross with Ghiz.
However, like Ghiz, it wasn’t his rural internet deal with Xplornet that got Shawn Graham into trouble. That happened when he gave $50 million in loans to Atcon (a Miramichi-based company) against the advice of his own staff. Alan Graham, Shawn’s father and former N.B. Liberal Cabinet Minister, was a director of Vänerply, a subsidiary of Atcon. Atcon went bankrupt, and very little of the $50 million was recovered. Graham was found guilty of violating conflict-of-interest guidelines; was issued a slap-on-the-wrist fine of $3,500; and stepped down as Premier.”
That was a quick glance from the perspective of the NB government’s involvement, in particular, Graham’s conflict of interest in the matter.
This Part Two is looking at the Atcon scandal primarily from the perspective of the other side, “Atcon” management’s role, of which a lot less in known publicly, or was ever even disclosed – and that’s largely the result of the combined doings and dealings of ATCON Management, and then after many years, ‘deals’ with the authorities to make the whole thing quietly go away.
I’ve taken the following few paragraphs (verbatim), from NBdatapoints for a pretty good ‘bird’s-eye” view, again, with the writer identifying the ‘scandal’ as the Premier’s conflict (See: ATCON The Ryan Report):
The Atcon controversy in New Brunswick stemmed from accusations that former Premier Shawn Graham and his Cabinet had used the power of office to influence decisions that resulted in the use of taxpayer dollars to prop up the Atcon Group, a construction company located in the Miramichi area. The taxpayer support came in the form of loan guarantees amounting to $50 million to the company in 2009, but by 2014 the province had lost $69 million from its ‘investments’ in the business (which went bankrupt in March 2010). The accusations of conflict-of-interest lead to an investigation that began in 2010 by Office of the Conflict of Interest Commissioner Patrick Ryan, and resulted in the Ryan Report in 2012.
It was not until 2017 that the Auditor-General for New Brunswick completed her review of how the money was spent. She concluded that the company was so badly managed that the provincial loan guarantees could not have saved the company. Although civil servants had warned that such loan guarantees for Atcon were very risky, they did not, said the AG, clearly tell Cabinet that the company was doomed. However, the Commissioner’s Report does show that the civil service did initially recommend that the request for loan guarantees be rejected.”
What about the details regarding the other side of the equation, i.e., the company requesting and receiving so many millions against advice, misrepresenting the health of the company deliberately, all for a DOOMED company?
Who was on the other side of the table of for those representing ATCON?
The Ryan report identified a “management team” comprising three people:
Former premier Shawn Graham, right, and Robbie Tozer, the president of Atcon, centre, appear at an undated news conference. Graham was found to be in a conflict of interest over his handling of the Atcon loan guarantees. (CBC)
“We have discussed these matters with Mr. Robert Tozer, President, Mr. Mark Ledwell, Vice President and Legal Counsel and Ms. Katrina Donovan, Vice President Finance and CFO (collectively hereinafter referred to as “Management”).” [Ryan Report, para 122].
The Ryan report dealt with a number of issues, including the lost public dollars, with the key “Exhibit Book” Ryan put together being over 600 pages, so you might be interested in perusing it.
It contains lots of sworn ‘witness testimony,’ including the Premier – and Mark Ledwell comes up over 40 times in a search:
It’s loaded with private documents and emails never made public, including the documents on Scotiabank with those detailed concerns over Atcon’s accounting practices….my chapter two.
I thought other provinces had a better handle on things as far as archiving and protecting government records than PEI. Maybe not. I came across this in the Ryan Report:
It was only later with the Report of the Conflict of Interest Commissioner (Hon. Patrick A.A. Ryan, Q.C.), which extensively quotes the Ernst & Young (EY) Report dated August 4, 2009 (entered into evidence as Exhibit 71 in the Motion Record).
The “summary” says it all, identifying two categories of concern with accounting practices, and outright errors:
(A) Lawsuit against Grant Thornton and Kent Ostridge – 2014
On June 23, 2014, the Province of New Brunswick filed an action for negligence against Grant Thornton LLP, Grant Thornton International Ltd. and Kent M. Ostridge (together, “Grant Thornton”).
This was 1 1/2 years past the date when the statutory period allowing such a suit ended – i.e., 3 1/2 years past the time they discovered the fraud with the forensic audit from the Richter audit, which was February, 2011.
The claim arose out of the Province’s guarantee of $50 million. In signing the guarantees, the Province relied on an audit of Atcon’s financial statements prepared by Grant Thornton Chartered Accountant, Kent Ostridge.
In response, Grant Thornton brought a Summary Judgment Motion forward to have the province’s claim dismissed as “statute-barred” by virtue of the two-year limitation period stipulated under s. 5(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. L-8.5 (“LAA”)….and it was barred.
The NB government then appealed.
(B) Appeal to NB Court of Appeal
The “legal” question at the Appeal Court became a technical one about “when” there was enough information known to ‘start the clock’ on the statutory 2-year period, and on that point, the NB government had the lower Court’s decision barring an action overturned, allowed the government to proceed.
It was that ‘technical’ decision that then went to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court supported both the Appeal Court’s decision that the clock didn’t start until that draft report from Richter went to the Government February, 2011, but as I’ve already pointed out, but don’t mind doing it again because it’s so important, the NB government didn’t file for 3 1/2 years after that date, so the SSC ALSO confirmed the bar against an action established in the initial case ruling.
But there’s other really good information in those court filings, so that’s why I’m spending some time on them. In particular, there’s a good chronological summary available in the “appeal” judgment rendered by Justice Drapeau that shows how the province had a “winning hand” if not for the statutory bar.
There’s also a paragraph in that chronological overview that confirms that Mark Ledwell had been fully briefed on the Ostridge/Thornton report before taking it to the province as chief-negotiator for Atcon; as legal counsel for Atcon, he most certainly would have been required to have had such knowledge in hand with such high-level negotiations underway:
[18] Atcon’s cash flow problems persisted in F2009. In the fall of 2008, its senior management approached the Province seeking guarantees for loans with the Bank of Nova Scotia. Negotiations extended over the course of several months. On April 24, 2009, the Province advised Atcon its request for financial assistance had been conditionally approved. The province would provide loan guarantees totaling $50 million: $20 million to repay existing subordinated debt; up to $20 million in connection with a working capital loan; and $10 million to cover capital expenditures at Atcon’s facilities in Miramichi. The guarantees were subject to an external review of Atcon’s assets by an auditing firm deemed satisfactory to the responsible Minister.
[19] On April 24, 2009, Atcon proposed the external review be performed by its auditors, Grant Thornton. The province agreed on condition that Grant Thornton’s review related findings and opinions be communicated directly to it. Grant Thornton agreed.
[20] The F2009 audit field work was completed in early May. On May 19, 2009, Grant Thornton delivered its report regarding Atcon’s consolidated financial statements for F2009. The report (sometimes referred to as the Opinion or Representation Letter) was sent to John Watt, a Project Executive Officer with Business New Brunswick who was involved in dealing with Atcon’s request for financial assistance. It reads as follows:
In your letter dated April 24, 2009 related to financial assistance in the form of a government guarantee for Atcon Holdings Inc. you have requested a confirmation from the external auditor related to current assets consisting of receivables, inventory and other current assets. Based on discussions with Ms. Katrina Donovan, VP Finance and Administration – CFO we understand that this confirmation includes the status of the audit and a description of the procedures completed as part of the audit related to the assets identified in your letter. The audit of Atcon Holdings Inc. also includes the audit of Atcon Construction Inc., Atcon Industrial Services Inc. and Envirem Technologies Inc. Based on our audit of the consolidated entity Atcon Holdings Inc. (the Company), current assets consist of accounts receivable, inventory, including raw materials, supplies, finished goods and work in-progress, and other assets include prepaid expenses. Our audit of the Company was completed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and our opinion states the financial statements [present] fairly “in all material respects” the financial position, result of operations and cash flows as at January 31, 2009. For the audit of the Company, materiality was set at $1,200,000. We have completed our field work, and the audit report will be dated May 7, 2009. We have the following outstanding matters to complete before issuing our audit report: a) Obtain management representation letters; b) Finalize the financial statement disclosures; c) Update the legal letters currently received to May 7, 2009. We have currently received all legal letter replies and there were no exceptions; d) Receive a copy of the guarantee from the Province of New Brunswick in support of the new credit facility; e) Receive a copy of the new credit facility from the lending institution [Bank of Nova Scotia]. Once the above items are resolved Grant Thornton will be issuing an unqualified audit report on the Company’s January 31, 2009 financial statements. Grant Thornton has provided management with all audit adjustments and these adjustments have been reviewed and approved by management.“
Note again that this fraudulent report claiming to be in line with CA standards was reviewed and approved by Ledwell et. al. in May, 20o9 several months before the Scotiabank challenge to Atcon management over their accounting practices.
It’s likely that Scotiabank did their own review at that particular time because they had most likely already been privy to the information about that loan approval – perhaps even seen the Thornton financials submitted to the province.
They were the “lender” getting the NB government guarantees, after all.
They would be careful and cautious, but if the NB government were willing to cover the risk…it would be foolish for a bank to adopt anything but a “mum’s” the word response, and that’s what the public got from them – until that report was uncovered and made public by the AG years later.
I was puzzled as to why Ledwell would ‘defend’ those obviously flawed practices outside the scope of standard accounting practices that were clearly designed to misrepresent the true situation financially, to make the company look good.
Puzzled until realizing what they were REALLY dong at the time with Scotiabank was defending what they had done to get that loan – something that was of course indefensible.
And finally, just one more key paragraph in the Court of Appeal Judgment at para. 24:
“[24] On June 30, 2009, the Province executed and delivered the guarantees. The
motions judge found the province did so based on Grant Thornton’s May 19, 2009 report to Mr. Watt, its Unqualified Auditor’s Report and the audited F2009 financial statements. No one has taken issue with that finding.”
The appeal court allowed the action, arguing that the province didn’t have the information it needed to ‘launch a claim’, as the previous judge ruling to dismiss because the 2-year time from the ‘submission’ had run out.
But as you can see, it should have been known by the NB government and its lawyers that the 2-year period had still run out from the point the fraud was detected, i.e., submission of the Richter Audit Report in 2011.
It’s not really a complicated legal matter since everything hung on one single point, that technical issue regarding when the 2-year statutory period was ‘triggered’.
You already know the outcome of that ‘technical’ issue – the province won with this SCC decision, and also won some extra time for that ‘trigger’ date. Still barred!
But there was great information in his ruling which really shows that the legal ‘game’ being played never hid the fact that the emperor was standing in the courtroom naked as a jaybird the whole time:
The evidence was all on the table – it was a massive fraud orchestrated by Atcon and made possible by Grant Thornton, Ostridge, with Mark Ledwell leading the negotiations with the province,
With a clear basis to ‘bar’ action on the time issue, the Judge could have made a very short and simple ruling – he didn’t need to get into the ‘details’ of the case he effectively had no authority to make a ruling on.
But he did.
So I’ll reproduce some of the best of that to show how everyone can see the emperor naked, but was indeed naked, but what are ya gonna do….?
From the SCC Ruling:
” In the instant case, the province had actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts — namely, that a loss occurred and that the loss was caused or contributed to by an act or omission of the auditor — when it received the draft report from the other firm on February 4, 2011. The auditor’s act or omission was issuing its report with respect to the company’s financial statements, despite those statements not being prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and not fairly representing, in all material respects, the company’s financial position. This act or omission caused or contributed to the province’s loss because the province executed the $50 million in loan guarantees in reliance on the auditor’s representations. Nothing more was needed to draw a plausible inference of negligence. The province’s claim is therefore statute‑barred by s. 5(1)(a) of the LAA.”
No one’s denying that Grant Thornton and Ostridge – and Atcon management – were guilty of a massive fraud, but the ‘legal bus” on the way to jail had left the station…whoops! Sorry, you missed it!
If a lawsuit had been filed at that time or anytime shortly-thereafter getting the Forensic Audit of Ostridge’s work on behalf of Atcon, then the NB government would have had its case heard, and would have easily WON that case!
Not only launching a lawsuit, but ALSO launching a complaint with the NB Chartered Accountants.
There was action taken on another front after getting the Richter report.
The Deputy Minister of Economic Development, in a letter to the New Brunswick Institute of Chartered Accountants filed its formal complaint on December 21, 2012 with an attached copy of the Richter report.
Yet the NB government waited a full year and a half later – well after the 2-year statutory bar which any lawyer would surely have known about, then filed.
Why?
Let’s look at what doing that achieved::
(1) to put a “we’re at it” face on the NB government with respect to taking action to recover loss millions; and
(2) to give the Chartered Accountants a reason to put the complaint filed with the Chartered Accountants on “pause” while “…the matter is before the courts”.
The SCC January, 2021 Ruling only, finally, told the parties what they already both knew full-well they would hear 9 years earlier=when they first launched in 2014 – it’s a” no go”!
That then compelled the Chartered Accountant’s Association to deal with the complaints they had been held in abeyance during the legal challenge.
It then took them another 4 years pondering the obvious until holding a hearing and issuing a ruling a year ago, in January 2025, which I’ll deal with subsequently, but no surprise: “guilty as charged”.
That’s how the justice system works to protect those known to have committed fraud causing major economic losses – Grant Thornton and the auditor who did this fraudulent assessment for Mark Ledwell to take to Graham to take to Cabinet – Kent Ostrich.
Graham then chaired an Executive Council Meeting after two previous failed attempts, insisted on waiving security (unprecedented), said nothing about his dad being on an Atcon Board of Directors receiving a monthly ‘director fee’ for years.
To sum up this chapter…
The Supreme Court of Canada file number 39182 is the case Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick on July 29, 2021. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal, ruling in favor of the auditors (Grant Thornton) by restoring the original judgment that the Province’s claim was statute-barred.
The Court clarified the “discoverability” rule, stating that a limitation period begins once a plaintiff has enough information to draw a “plausible inference” of negligence, rather than needing full certainty of every element of the claim.
This audit was called for by the Legislative Assembly, but had a very narrow scope: just to (1) Audit all financial assistance given to Atcon; and (2) make recommendations to improve the performance of the Department.
The outrage the AG obviously felt over how the Premier and Cabinet overrode strong NO recommendations from the department is palpable in the documents, and there are comments about how such power is undemocratic – statements unfamiliar and not normally seen in AG financial investigation reports.
I’ll share just 2 of the 37 slides, then move on to the 2017 AG follow-up report that had a much wider mandate, and powers to investigate where all the $70 million went.
2
Volume II: This volume presents a special examination which details findings and work performed to address remaining unanswered questions from the 2015 Report “Financial Assistance to Atcon Holdings Inc. and Industry.
As you can see from the subtitle, the theme is still in part on “Unanswered Questions”. But she did answer quite a few!
Here are a few of the slides as well, some with good information for the purpose of this article. I’ll not make comments to let you examine the slides on your own:
The NB government had been informed in February, 2011 about the financial deception and fraudulent report from Grant Thornton which Atcon management had presented to the NB government department in a bid to get for the $50 million loan guarantees.
In December, 2012, the NB Deputy Minister for the Department responsible for economic development filed a complaint with the NBICA (New Brunswick Institute of Charter Accountants).
By law, decisions from the disciplinary committee of NB Chartered Accountants must be made public. The decision was finally rendered on this matter in January 2025. It’s on their website now in the archives under “Disciplinary Hearing Summaries”.
There’s paragraphs of detailed violations in the ruling!
What should have been MANDATORY – i.e., that Ostridge NEVER PRACTICE AS A CA AGAIN – well, his CA peers and NB government found a way around that outcome!
And what a stretch!
The rules were clear about the penalty, but everything hung on a question of whether there was any ‘public interest‘ concern:
That the “joint request” from both parties – NB government and Thornton/Ostridge – asked that this admitted fraud robbing taxpayers of $50 million even made such a request is more than “unhinged” – it’s evidence of what we all know deep -down which I don’t even need to state.
That the “disciplinary committee” members of the NB Chartered Accountants could go along with this though, and write a paragraph like the following, is strong evidence that corruption at the highest levels of business and government doesn’t normally get the punishment it deserves, at least not in this case.
Ostridge received a $50,000 fine…never missed a day of work!
There was also $300,000 of ‘costs,’ which I’m sure Grant Thornton was happy to pick up for getting the NB government to drop all charges against the ‘firm’.
Opprobrium? Seriously?
You could count the number of people who ever knew Ostridge did this on one hand, and it’s all smiles in his profile picture promoting his professionalism.
Mark Ledwell had already announced his bid for leader of the PC Party and had been on the campaign trail for 6 months when his “partner in crime” at Atcon back in 2009, the CFO, Katrina Donovan, was finally having the complaint that was filed against her dealt with by the NB Chartered Accountants.
That “team effort” at Atcon (Ledwell and Donovan ran things) was all forgotten history for Mark.
As he stated in his announcement back in May, 2025, his sights are on forming a new ‘team’:
“We need an experienced leader to assemble a vibrant team and deliver a new prosperity agenda for our province.”
Meanwhile, back in Moncton at that disciplinary hearing against Donovan on November 7, 2025 that never actually happened, penalties that should have been imposed against Donovan never were because of another “alternate settlement” process that doesn’t even mention “public interest”:
The NB government name is “redacted” – so much for making the disciplinary hearing “rulings”” public.
I guess with the “alternative dispute approach,” the CA committee members felt that was ok. But why? Who else could it be filing in December, 2012, the same time as Thornton and Ostridge – then waiting for exactly the same number of years?
Donovan was also accused of the very same major infraction as Ostridge, deliberate “misrepresentation” of the financials, aka “fraud, but in the “Settlement Agreement” reached in the alternate process requested and allowed, she indicated that she planned on retiring from the profession, didn’t plan to ever practice again, and the NB government agreed that was penalty enough:
The book is closed, the story lost to antiquity, with little or no “collective memory” left about Atcon anywhere, not even in the province where it all happened.
At the Helm
(Mark Ledwell’s key role in the Atcon Scandal)
This is Mark Ledwell’s LinkedIn profile for his Ontario-based consulting business (Toronto address on incorporation, but its also registered in PEI, appearing in the corporate registry as a “extra-provincial” corporation).
He’s still an active lawyer with Gowlings law firm.
I believe the very first paragraph of his LinkedIn profile fairly presents who Mark Ledwell is comfortable serving:
“I assist businesses in Canada and internationally, and mentor business leaders, entrepreneurs, and lawyers.”
Here’s what he says about his 7-year run at Atcon on that same LinkedIn page, although he doesn’t actually mention the company’s name for some strange reason, something you would think would be compulsory for a career bio:
“2003-2009 I served as General Counsel to a Canadian industrial group that developed major infrastructure projects across Canada, and in the Alberta oil sands, and co-led a successful joint venture that won the National Award for Innovation and Financing (Brunway, 2006) by the Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships.”
NO TRUH – NO CONSEQUENCES
Mark Ledwell was at the very centre of this “mismanagement” as both V-P of the companies operations, its legal counsel, and it’s public spokesperson, although he left just in advance of the bankruptcy, and was not around to speak to his key role in the entire affair.
The story has been told in the previous chapters, but it’s worth sharing a few observations concerning evidence that it was Ledwell at the very centre of this massive mismanagement costing voters so many millions.
Lawyers are good at keeping out of public view, and Mark’s key role remains largely hidden due to the kinds of secrecy protection he skillfully employs and enjoys with “client-solicitor” privilege, and also just the fact that we’re talking about private emails and documents, not public.
So it’s worth piecing a few facts together to get a sense of why Ledwell has remained out of the limelight with this issue largely, with no consequences for his key role in this fraud and lost to taxpayers.
You’ll notice, for example, that it was Ledwell who Scotiabank was communicating with on the big issues:
In the “Exhibit Book” and the final investigation report by Commissioner Patrick Ryan, Ledwell is listed as part of the management team responsible for the company’s information. From the Management/Sales Section (Exhibit Book, Page 11):
“Sales for Atcon are generated through the combined effort of the following persons: Robert Tozer-CEO, Mark Ledwell-Vice President and General Counsel, Gordon Burns-VP Sales and Business Development.”
Also from the Ryan Report:
“Mark Ledwell, Vice President and Legal Counsel and Ms. Katrina Donovan, Vice President Finance and CFO (collectively hereinafter referred to as ‘Management’). A brief summary follows: Errors – In the course of our review we have identified errors such as duplicate accounts receivable accruals, duplicate inventory postings, under-reported HST, employee source deductions, and wage accruals, etc.”
While the Auditor General’s reports focus heavily on the decisions made by the provincial Cabinet and the Department of Business New Brunswick, Mark Ledwell is referred to in the capacity of his role as the legal and operational representative for Atcon during the period when the company was seeking government assistance.
The reports note that during the due diligence process (or lack thereof), information was provided by Atcon’s senior management.
In the 2015 AG report, there are references to communications between the Department of Business New Brunswick (BNB) and Atcon’s “Vice President and General Counsel” (Ledwell) regarding the security and terms of the $50 million and $13.3 million loan guarantees.
While not a direct paragraph from the Attorney General’s legal report, official records and investigative journalism frequently cited his departures and statements during the scandal’s peak:
“The Miramichi-based vice-president who used to handle media requests, Mark Ledwell, left Atcon last fall [2009].” (This was often cited in the context of the company’s declining transparency as it approached bankruptcy.)
Ledwell acted as the primary contact for media inquiries regarding Atcon’s mounting debts, but never shared much information about what was really going on.
In 2009, for example, he issued statements explaining that the company’s inability to pay suppliers was due to difficulty collecting payments from clients, specifically regarding the CNRL Horizon oilsands project in Alberta, but wouldn’t disclose amounts, citing “business confidentiality”.
“In an email to CBC News, Mark Ledwell, a vice-president at Atcon, refused to say how much his firm lost on the CNRL project and why a provincial loan guarantee wasn’t enough to let the company pay its suppliers. No one at CNRL’s head office in Calgary was willing to talk about Atcon, either. In a February letter to Tracer Industries Canada, another of its unpaid suppliers, Atcon said it hadn’t been paid in full for work it did on CNRL’s Horizon oilsands project. In that letter, Ledwell wrote that Atcon had been forced to settle a dispute with CNRL and had suffered “significant losses” on the jobs, implying there’s no more money to come from CNRL. Four months later, Atcon received three provincial loan guarantees totaling $50 million.”
Financial Oversight: According to the Ryan Report, Ledwell was part of the “Management” team (alongside President Robert Tozer and CFO Katrina Donovan) that met with Ernst & Young auditors in August 2009.
Audit Disputes: The Ryan Report and court transcripts for NB’s legal action detail that Ledwell and other management members disagreed with an Ernst & Young assessment that identified $18.6 million in potentially non-compliant financial items, including duplicate accounts receivable and inventory postings.
While Ledwell is frequently cited in the Conflict of Interest Commissioner’s report as a key member of management, his specific “testimony” is characterized in official records by his participation in the internal reviews and his correspondence (via email and formal letters) defending the company’s financial position and collection efforts.
Official records and journalists frequently cited Mark Ledwell’s abrupt departure and previous statements as company spokesperson during the scandal’s peak:
“The Miramichi-based vice-president who used to handle media requests, Mark Ledwell, left Atcon last fall [2009].” (This was often cited in the context of the company’s declining transparency as it approached bankruptcy.) [See: Ex-Atcon exec sues N.B. firm for unpaid bills].
Being both Vice President of Operations and General Counsel for Atcon. Mark Ledwell was one of the primary points of contact between the company and the provincial government for negotiating the financial assistance packages.
As General Counsel, he was also involved in the internal reviews of Atcon’s financial reporting.
When one of the requirements stipulated to receive the loan i.e., setting up an advisory board, Mark Ledwell was listed as the contact on the media release.
“Between a rock and a hard place: reflections on the upcoming February 7th PC Leadership Convention
The information in this article should result in Mark Ledwell withdrawing from the PC leadership race.
What’s the chances of that happening?
Having said that….
MY HONEST OPINION IS THAT NEITHER LANTZ NOR LEDWELL SHOULD BE PREMIER.
Why?
Because neither intends to address he culture of corruption that’s destroying our democracy, making an honest government that’s capable of displacing the control of an elite business and professional class in PEI (small enough to be a ‘club’) impossible.
Given all the crises we’re facing, too much is at stake for our children and future to keep “sanitizing” the truth just to comply with the Anne-Land Code of Cordial Conduct [You do know she was seriously addicted to CORDIAL herself don’t you?],
Neither Lantz nor Ledwell should lead this province in my opinion, but it’s going to be one of the two no matter – the door’s now officially been shut:
Neither Lantz nor Ledwell are willing to go where a leader with a solid moral foundation, integrity, courage and a true vision for PEI needs to go with leadership.
An honest assessment of both our recent history of bad, secretive, document-destroying governance embroiled in scandal after scandal, and with our present situation full of crises also rife with secrecy and corruption demands a true hero of a leader willing to speak truth, and yes, name a few names in that club. Otherwise, that’s what we’re left with…the club, and like baby seals lying helpless on the ice, that club…. (sorry, not going to go there).
If we’re ever to have a future with a government that truly serves people honestly, we need a leader willing to:
CONDUCT A PUBLIC INQUIRY WITH CLEAR TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SCOPE TO INVESTIGATE GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT AND DECISIONS IN BLISS & WISDOM.
Only that will provide an antidote for the political poison that’s killing our democracy.
If neither Lantz nor Ledwell are willing to do that, then the secrecy and corruption that breeds nepotism and self-serving government will simply continue until our little empire here on the East Coast collapses.
And it will collapse,
Even if the local media won’t provide the kind of moral awareness and insight necessary for the electorate to see collapse on the horizon and immediately shelve the niceties and DEMAND change, or to even grasp the true scope of the problem we’re facing, the REST OF THE COUNTRY (and increasingly, the “world” – with the Bliss & Wisdom CCP project sitting on our soil and now being watched globally) will stop ‘liking us’ and helping us in all kinds of economic and political ways that won’t be good news for our already nearly-bankrupt province.
MORE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
There so many questions that remain unanswered regarding Mark’s role in the scandal of the century, now confirmed to have been fraud.
If you’ve come this far, then I’m sure you’ve already come up with a few questions of your own, maybe ones such as:
“Did Mark have a family member on a ‘bogus’ payroll?”
“How often did he use the company jet, and for what purposes?”
Or more important questions, like:
“Would Mark still defend those accounting practices following the admission of premeditated FRAUD by Ostridge?”
I’d love to hear his answer to that one.
On February 7, 2026, either Rob Lantz or Mark Ledwell will be our Premier going into the next election, which I suspect will be soon, because regardless of who wins, neither will want to show us the books in a budget this coming Spring.
Both will disappoint.
Both serve the backroom, but with different, distinctive styles.
There’s two types of “Premiers” in PEI’s history – those who see themselves as “the smartest person in the room,” with lots of credentials, who TELL THE BACKROOM where it’s going.
That would be your Mark Ledwell candidate.
The other kind emulates famous Canadians like ‘Casey’ (remember “Mr. Dress up” with the puppets Casey and Finnigan?).
That would be your Rob Lantz candidate.
Like Casey, Lantz has a hidden hand [THE BACKROOM] that you never see. Like AI online nowadays, the deception is good: one can easily fool themselves into thinking they’re talking to a person, leader, Premier, when that’s not the case…it’s the Casey.
Lantz was absolutely committed to giving Islanders FULL TRANSPARENCY on egaming when he was leader running to be premier but lost his seat in the process…remember?
Full disclosure?
An important first step?
This egaming scandal, cover-up and tragedy is STILL CAUSING HUGE HARM, and likely increasing what the Province will end-up having to pay out as time passes, and here we are 10 years later, and LANTZ WON’T SAY A SINGLE WORD ABOUT EGAMING.
I’ve already publicly brought this matter to his attention, shortly after he was appointed premier:
Are you getting the picture??
Either person – Ledwell or Lantz – will bring us on just a slightly different ‘direction,’ with the same backroom boys (and a few girls) running things – again, pick your poison…but please do your soul a solid and take a hard pass on that cordial!
IS THERE A REMEDY?
What’s the correction for this corrupt culture and the coming convention choosing a course clearly calibrated for continued corruption?
How about someone sign-up to attend the upcoming PC Convention and bring a bottle of truth serum to slip into the candidate’s Raspberry Cordial before their big speeches?
That was a bit of a moral lapse….I take it back. It would be unethical to solicit the truth without consent, even when 37 MLAs won’t give it voluntarily if it involves tarnishing the (assumed) good name of a fellow colleague in the club.
What we desperately need now are VOTERS with courage who care enough about such things to demand integrity, not just “assume it” is is there.
Perhaps even to stand up to ask a question of the candidates that will result in a few people spitting their cordial. across the table.
Sigh.
“More Cordial anyone??”
=
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